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The Effect of Mood on the Perception of Facial Expressions and Social Interaction in 
Adults 
 
Chit Yuen Yi 
 
The present study examined how mood influences perception of facial expressions, and how 
emotion perception predicts differences in social interactions, in a sample of 75 young adults (49 
females and 26 males, 18 -37 years of age). Participants were assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions in which they recalled a personally meaningful emotional event 
(positive vs. negative). They then completed an emotion perception task that assessed their 
recognition accuracy and perceived intensity of emotions. At the end of the study, they also 
engaged in a social interaction with a same-sex confederate while being unobtrusively observed. 
The results did not support the mood-congruity effect on perception of emotional expressions. 
However, negative mood impaired participants’ performance in recognizing neutral expressions. 
Individuals also perceived neutral expressions as more negative after mood induction. There was 
evidence that mood influenced the amount of additional comments and positive affect exhibited 
during the social interaction and that perceived intensity of negative emotions predicted more 
prolonged eye contacts with the confederate. However, the present study did not find evidence of 
moderating or mediating effects of emotion perception on how mood influences social 
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The Effect of Mood on the Perception of Facial Expressions and Social Interaction in 
Adults 
 
Facial expressions of emotion convey important information about the emotional state of 
the expresser (Ekman, 1993). During everyday interactions, we often rely on the facial 
expression of others to judge their emotional state. The emotional messages we interpret from 
other’s facial expression help us to make inferences about other’s attitude and intention 
(Fridlund, 1994), to regulate our own emotions (Manstead & Fischer, 2001) and to guide our 
social interaction (Keltner & Kring, 1998). Therefore, our ability to perceive others’ emotions 
from faces serves an important social function to help us to maintain our interpersonal 
relationships, to coordinate our own emotional responses, and to monitor our social behaviors. 
Previous studies with children and adults have linked emotion perception accuracy to better 
social adjustment (Leppänen & Hietanen, 2001; Engelberg & Sjöberg, 2004) and mental health 
(Lembke & Ketter, 2002; Surguladze, Young, Senior, Brébion, Travis, & Phillips, 2004).   
Given the importance of emotion perception in regulating our social life and interpersonal 
communication, many researchers have investigated personal characteristics that could influence 
one’s perception of facial expressions. A number of studies from this line of research have 
focused on the affective state of an individual because emotions can have a powerful influence 
on cognitive processes, such as perception (e.g., Persad & Polivy, 1993; Chepenik, Cornew, & 
Farah, 2007, Trevisani, Johnson, & Carver, 2008; Schmid & Mast, 2010). However, these 
investigations have largely emphasized the impact of affective state on the accuracy of emotion 
recognition, especially in clinical population with mood disorders (e.g., Cooley & Nowicki, 
1989; Bouhuys, Greet, & Gordjin, 1999; Surguladzeet al., 2004; Trevisani et al., 2008). 
According to Thomas, De Bellis, Graham and LaBar (2007), methods that focused on the 
accuracy of emotion recognition were prone to ceiling effect in performance because the emotion 
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recognition task was generally simple and easy. Therefore, relying on the accuracy of emotion 
recognition might not be sensitive enough to capture the perceptual processing of emotional 
facial expressions. To better tap into the perceptual process, the first goal of the present study is 
to examine the influence of affective state on recognition accuracy as well as perceived intensity 
of emotional facial expressions among healthy individuals. Although acknowledged as a key 
impetus for emotion perception research (Fischer & van Kleef, 2010), the study of how 
perception of facial expression predicts subsequent social behaviors of the perceiver is scarce. 
Therefore, the second goal is to understand whether emotion perception is associated with social 
interaction.  
Mood-congruity effect on emotion perception 
 Often within previous research regarding the impact of affective state on perception of 
facial expressions, the terms “mood” and “emotion” are used interchangeably. To avoid 
confusion, it is important to define these basic terms. According to Russell (2003), affect refers 
to the neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible as the simple, primitive and 
ubiquitous feelings evident in moods and emotions. It is often used as a higher order term that 
encompasses all affective constructs. The term “affect” is used when researchers of the reviewed 
studies did not specify their terminology. Mood is the affective construct that has no clear 
impetus or antecedent. It is mild in intensity and is long-lasting. On the other hand, emotion is 
the relatively short-lived and more intense affective construct. It is usually directed at a person, a 
condition, a thing or an event. In the present study, we asked the participants to recall an 
emotional life event. Although the event recall might elicit a certain emotion/emotions in our 
participants, we expected the manipulation to have a lasting effect on their mood. Therefore, 
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more precisely, we investigated the mood effect on perception of facial expressions and social 
interaction. 
 Past research regarding the impact of affective state on emotion perception has relied on 
different methodologies. Vast amount of research on emotion perception of facial expression 
looked at people’s accuracy in recognizing different basic emotions (i.e. happy, sad, anger, etc.) 
from static face stimuli. In these studies, participants were asked to either respond to forced-
choice questions (e.g., Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971; Chepeniket al., 2007; 
Thomas, De Beliis, Graham, & LaBar, 2007) or to label the emotions based on what they saw in 
the emotion recognition task (e.g., Schiffenbauer, 1974; Surguladaze et al., 2004). Some early 
studies used schematic drawn emotional faces (e.g., Bouhuys, Bloem, & Grrothuis, 1995), 
whereas others used prototypical emotional faces of human adults (e.g., Schiffenbauer, 1974; 
Chepenik et al., 2007; Schmid & Mast, 2010). In both cases, researchers were interested in 
people’s accuracy in recognizing facial expression of emotions under a certain affective state. A 
person was said to have a positive perceptual bias if he/she was less accurate in recognizing 
negative emotions or attributed positive emotions to neutral face stimuli under a positive 
affective state. If a person was less accurate in recognizing positive emotions or attributed 
negative emotions to neutral face stimuli under a negative affective state, he/she was consider as 
showing a negative perceptual bias (Schmid & Mast, 2010).  
To examine these biases in recognition of ambiguous facial emotions, some researchers 
have used morphed faces, in which two basic emotions (e.g., happy and anger, anger and fear, 
etc.) of different intensity were blended into a single facial expression (e.g., Richards, French, 
Calder, Webb, Fox, & Young, 2002). These faces could be interpreted in one way or the other, 
depending on the perception of a person. For example, a happy-anger morphed face can be 
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recognized as either happy or anger based on how participants perceive the facial expression. 
Studies using morphed face have provided evidence that biased judgment of facial expressions 
was mood-specific. Participants tended to perceive ambiguous facial expressions as displaying 
the emotion that was congruent with their current affective state (see van Der Veen, Evers, 
Deutz, & Schmitt, 2007; Lee, Ng, Tang, & Chan, 2008). 
Together, results from these studies revealed that people show mood-specific bias in the 
recognition of emotional facial expressions (e.g., Cooley & Nowicki, 1989, Chepenik et al., 
2007; Lee et al., 2008; Schmid & Mast, 2010). The rationale is that the affective state of an 
individual facilitates the processing of mood-congruent information and hinders the processing 
of mood-incongruent information (Bower, 1981). Therefore, the first part of the present study 
sought to examine the effect of mood on perceived intensity of prototypical emotions, in addition 
to accuracy in recognizing these emotions. 
 Past research on emotion-recognition ability mostly concerned clinical patients who have 
mood disorders, with a focus on mood effect on recognition accuracy and perceptual bias to 
emotional face stimuli (e.g., Cooley & Nowicki, 1989; Surguladze et al., 2004). It is important to 
consider the studies of emotion perception among clinical patients because mood disorders 
represented the extreme case of mood disturbance. The existence of mood-specific perceptual 
bias in patients with mood disorders would provide an incentive to further understand the impact 
of affective state on perception of emotional facial expressions. 
  Previous studies regarding the nature of the impairment in perception of facial 
expressions in depressed patients have generated mixed results. Some researchers found 
evidence for a generalized deficit in recognition of all emotions (e.g., Persad & Polivy, 1993), 
while others (e.g., Bouhuys et al., 1999; Gollan, McCloskey, Hoxha, & Coccaro, 2010) reported 
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negative perceptual bias in depressed patients, revealing that they were prompted to pay more 
attention to negative information and thus recognized more sadness in facial expressions than 
healthy individuals. Such discrepant findings could be attributed to different methodologies 
adopted in those studies. First, different studies used different types of stimuli. In some of the 
studies, Ekman photos were used (e.g., Persad & Polivy, 1993), whereas other researchers used 
schematic drawn faces (e.g., Bouhuys et al., 1999). Second, stimuli were presented for different 
duration in these studies. Third, stimuli across the studies differed in the intensity of displayed 
emotions. For instance, Surguladzeet al. (2004) found that depressed patients, compared with 
healthy individuals, were less accurate in recognizing sad and happy facial expressions presented 
for shorter duration (100ms), but no significant difference were found when the stimuli were 
presented for 2000ms. Depressed patients were also less likely to identify low-intensity happy 
and neutral faces as happy (Surguladze et al., 2004). This finding is further supported by an 
event-related potential (ERP) study that provided evidence for an impaired cognitive processing 
ability in emotion recognition for low-intensity happy faces in depressed patients (Cavanagh & 
Geisler, 2006). 
 Biased response to emotional face stimuli was also found in patients with mania (e.g., 
Lembke & Ketter, 2002). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Lennox, Jacob, 
Calder, Lupson and Bullmore (2004) provided evidence that Bipolar I mania patients who were 
in an elated mood showed deficits in recognition of sadness in faces during the behavioral task, 
which was accompanied by an abnormal brain activation in the paralimbic regions that are 
responsible for emotion recognition and mood disorders. In a recent study on individuals who are 
at risk for mania, Trevisani et al. (2008) found that individuals who scored higher on the 
Hypomanic Personality Scale performed particularly better in identifying subtle happy faces 
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when in a positive mood. In general, this line of research suggested that clinical patients with 
mood disorders showed impaired recognition of emotional face stimuli that were incongruent 
with their own mood state and heightened responses to emotional face stimuli that were 
congruent with their mood state, especially when the face stimuli were presented for a short 
period of duration. Their ability to recognize emotional face stimuli was rather intact when the 
faces were presented for a longer duration (Surguladze et al., 2004). To understand whether there 
is a natural tendency to show mood-congruity effect, we investigated this effect in a normal 
population without a current diagnosis of depression. In particular, we examined whether there is 
mood-congruity effect on the recognition and perceived intensity of emotions. 
 To date, published research on the association between normal variation of mood and 
emotion perception in healthy individuals is rare. Some research focused on the effect of sad 
mood (e.g., Chepenik et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2008). These studies attempted to induce sad mood 
in healthy participants using guided imagination of an upsetting event (Chepenik et al., 2007) or 
sad movie clips (Lee et al., 2008). Although Chepenik and colleagues (2007) reported that 
participants showed a general impairment in facial emotion recognition when in a sad mood 
relative to a neutral mood, their results could be attributed to the cognitive overload of the 
participants as they were also tested on six other cognitive tasks under the induced mood. Lee 
and her colleagues (2008), on the other hand, found evidence for a mood-specific negative bias 
in the judgment of facial expressions among healthy participants who were induced to 
experience a sad mood. The “sad” participants, compared to those who felt happy or neutral, 
perceived more sadness in morphed faces, which consisted of blended expressions of a positive 
emotion and a negative emotion. These results are consistent with previous findings that sad 
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mood in healthy participants was associated with a negative bias in the perception of emotional 
facial expression in line-drawn faces (Bouhuys et al., 1995).  
Recent research regarding mood effects on emotion recognition in healthy participants 
was conducted by Schmid and Mast (2010). They extended previous research in the area by 
including the examination of positive mood (as well as negative mood). In the study, participants 
were primed to experience happy, sad or neutral mood with the corresponding mood-evoking 
movie clips. They were then asked to perform an emotion recognition task that contained happy 
and sad facial stimuli. The results revealed that sad participants recognized sad facial expressions 
better than happy ones (in favor of a negative bias), whereas happy participants showed a non-
significant trend of better recognition of happy facial expression as compared to sad ones 
(suggesting a positive bias). Although the Bouhuy et al. (1995), Lee et al. (2008) and Schmid and 
Mast (2010) studies provided evidence for mood-specific perceptual bias in emotion recognition, 
they solely focused on the accuracy of emotion recognition. The present study further examined 
participants’ perceived intensity of the emotions, in addition to their accuracy in recognizing 
emotions after mood induction. 
Theoretical background 
Three cognitive theories or phenomena could explain why one’s affective states may 
influence the processing of emotional information in facial stimuli: 1) mood-congruity effect 
(Bower, 1981); 2) affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995); and 3) top-down processing theory 
(Niedenthal & Halberstadt, 2003). According to Bower (1981), mood-congruity effect refers to 
the tendency to attend to and learn more about materials that match ones’ mood states. This 
tendency can be explained by the semantic-network theory, which suggests that we form a 
network of association among different semantic concepts and schemas to help us make sense of 
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the world. Activation of one concept would lead to the activation of other concepts along the 
associative network. This theory suggests that each mood state, such as a depressed or elated 
state, has a specific unit in our memory that is connected with many other aspects of the mood by 
the associative linkages between these aspects. Therefore, the current mood state of a person 
would make mood-congruent materials more salient and accessible to the person, easing the 
processing of these materials. 
Another mechanism through which our affective state may influence our perceptual 
processing and evaluative judgment of other’s facial expression is called affect infusion. The 
affect infusion model (AIM), introduced by Forgas (1995), states that our affective experiences 
exert an influence on our judgmental process and become incorporated into the process. More 
precisely, our emotional feelings can directly inform our judgment during quick, heuristic 
processing such that we use our current mood state as a shortcut to arrive at a judgment. In 
support of this notion, Schwarz (1990) suggested that our mood states serve informative 
functions to help us make sense of the situation we are experiencing and guide our response to 
the situation. According to Schwarz’s (1990) affect-as-information model, when we need to 
make evaluative judgment about something, we frequently use our mood state at the time of the 
judgment as a reference in making our decision. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that people 
would pay more attention to emotional cues that are consistent with their own mood states. In the 
context of perception of facial expressions, the affective infusion model and the affect-as-
information model predict that people would consult their mood state when they need to make a 
quick judgment about other’s emotional facial expressions, making mood-congruent information 
more available to their judgmental process. Therefore, emotionally-aroused individuals would be 
more susceptible to mood-congruity effects during emotion perception task.  
9 
 
Mood states can also influence one’s perception of facial expression through top-down 
processing (Niedenthal & Halberstadt, 2003). According to top-down theory of information 
processing (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975), we draw on information already stored in our memory 
to make assumption or presuppositions about the material being processed. Therefore, it is 
expected that our mood states would activate mood-congruent concepts, which would then be 
used to help us interpret other’s facial expression, leading us to attribute our own emotions to 
other people. 
Factors affecting emotion perception 
 In addition to the affective state of the perceiver, researchers have identified other 
personal characteristics that could influence the perception of emotional facial expression. For 
example, women generally outperformed men in tasks measuring the processing of emotional 
faces, such as emotion recognition task (e.g., Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Montagne, Kessels, 
Frigerio, de Haan, & Perrett, 2005; Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 2010). 
Variation in attachment-related anxiety was found to relate to individual difference in sensitivity 
to emotional stimuli (Fraley, Niedenthal, Marks, Brumbaugh, & Vicary, 2006). Specifically, 
highly anxious individuals were sensitive to changes in facial expression of emotions, but they 
made more errors in recognizing the displayed emotions than less anxious individuals. 
Maltreatment during childhood also has been associated with atypical processing of emotions. 
Individuals with a family history of abuse showed heightened ability in identifying fearful facial 
stimuli (Masten, Guyer, Hodgdon, McClure, Charney, Ernst et al, 2008) and physically-abused 
children have been found to exhibit enhanced perceptual sensitivity to angry facial cues (Pollack 
& Kistler, 2002). Also, neglected children had more difficulty matching facial expressions to 
appropriate emotional situation and saw fewer distinctions between discrete emotions (Pollak, 
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Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 2000). These factors would be assessed as potential covariates on 
the association between affective state and emotion perception if they are correlated to the 
perception task variables in the present study. 
Mood, emotion perception and social interaction 
 There is empirical evidence that the affective state of individuals not only influences their 
perception of emotions from face stimuli, but also affects their perception of a hypothetical 
person and their assessment of their social relationships. Forgas and Bower (1987) found that 
people form favorable and positive impression-formation judgments about some hypothetical 
persons more frequently and more quickly when they were in a positive mood than when they 
were in a negative mood. A number of studies have also shown that current affective state 
influences individual’s evaluation of social relationships in a hypothetical scenario of social 
interaction. For instance, angry individuals perceived less fairness in an ongoing interaction 
(Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), fearful individuals perceived more possible risks and 
losses in the context of a potential social interaction (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Results from 
these studies imply that the affective influence on emotion perception and social judgment could 
potentially direct the behaviors of the perceiver during social interaction. However, research that 
examines the subsequent behaviors of an emotionally-aroused perceiver in a social interaction is 
scarce. Past study that focused on aggression found that participants who grew up in the South of 
the United States were more likely to engage in aggressive and dominant behaviors after being 
agitated by a verbal insult (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996). Some early studies in 
social psychology also revealed that positive mood increased general activation of behaviors 
such that people in a good mood were more likely to engage in helping behavior (Batson, Coke, 
Card, Smith, & Taliaferro, 1979) and initiate more conversation with the confederate (Isen, 
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1970). Other research tended to focus on how an individual’s expression and experience of 
emotion may influence another interacting person’s social behaviors (e.g., Throne, 1987; 
Tronick, 1989).  
Even less is known about how emotion perception may influence the way in which 
people interact with others. Research with social anxiety sample found evidence that perception 
of disgust expressions during a hypothetical social interaction deterred socially anxious 
individuals from interacting with the expressor (Schofield, Coles, & Gibb, 2007). This result 
suggests that perception of negative emotional cues can serve to maintain anxiety and avoidant 
behaviors related to interacting with the social world. In another laboratory study, perception of 
fear expressions facilitated approach behaviors, whereas perception of angry expressions 
promoted avoidance-related behaviors in a sample of college students (Marsh, Ambady, & 
Kleck, 2005). It is worth noting that Marsh and her colleagues (2005) operationalized avoidance-
approach behaviors as participants’ reaction time to pull (indicative of approach behavior) or 
push (indicative of avoidant behavior) a lever after viewing fearful or angry face stimuli. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether their results would apply in a social setting. To our knowledge, 
no previous research has investigated the effect of one’s general emotion perception on an 
unrelated social interaction, either in a naturally-occurring or experimentally-induced interaction. 
The present study attempted to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on the subsequent social 
behaviors of the perceiver in an unobtrusively videotaped staged social interaction. We predict 
that the mood state of an individual (the perceiver) would influence his/her perception of other 
person’s emotions, which in turn, would affect his/her social behaviors during an actual 
interaction with another person.  
12 
 
The present study 
The first goal of the present study is to investigate the effect of mood on emotion 
recognition accuracy and perceived intensity of emotions. To better understand the social 
consequences of emotion perception, the second goal of the study is to test whether mood and 
emotion perception relate to the subsequent social behaviors of the perceiver. The study was 
experimental in design wherein a sample of college students were randomly assigned to either a 
positive or negative mood induction condition. Participants’ accuracy in recognizing emotions 
from prototypical face stimuli and their perceived intensity of the emotions were compared 
across conditions. Following the emotion perception tasks, participants were unobtrusively 
observed as they engaged in a brief interaction with a confederate.   
Research question 1: Does affective state influence one’s perception of facial expression? 
Hypothesis 1a. Participants in a negative mood would be less accurate in identifying 
mood-incongruent face stimuli (e.g., happy and surprise) than in identifying mood-congruent 
stimuli (e.g., anger and sad); participants in a positive mood would be less accurate in identifying 
mood-incongruent face stimuli (e.g., anger and sad) than in identifying mood-congruent stimuli 
(happy and surprise) 
Hypothesis 1b.People would perceive mood-congruent expressions as more intense and 
mood-incongruent expressions as less intense. 




Research question 2: Does perception of facial expression affect social interaction? 
Hypothesis 2a. Participants in a negative mood state would show less initiative 
behaviors, make less eye contact with the confederate and exhibit more negative affect during 
social interaction; people who are in a positive mood state would show more initiative behaviors, 
make more eye contact with the confederate and exhibit more positive affect during the social 
interaction  
Hypothesis 2b. Because both a moderation and meditation model may be plausible, and 
there is no prior research linking emotion perception and behavior, two different models will be 
tested. The moderation model is based on the premise that those who rate mood-congruent faces 
as more intense in the emotion perception task would be more susceptible to the impact of 
affective state on social interaction (described in hypothesis 2a).  The meditational model only 
will be tested if the paths between mood and emotion perception and between emotion 
perception and behavior are significant. Support for this latter model would indicate that mood 
influences one’s social behaviors through its effect on emotion perception of the individual. 
Method 
Participants 
 Eighty seven college students were recruited through psychology course at West Virginia 
University. Advertisements of the study were shown in psychology courses by instructors and 
posted on bulletin boards in the Psychology Department (Life Science Building). Participants 
received course credits in a WVU psychology class for their participation in this 1-hour lab 
study. Exclusion criteria included 1) age of 18 or younger, 2) currently receiving treatment for 
depression, and 3) previous participation in Cognitive Performance Study conducted by the same 
research team. Using G-Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchnes, 2007), it was 
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determined that N = 77 would be needed to obtain power at the .80 level to detect a medium 
effect (f 
2
 =.25) at .05 significance level in an omnibus multiple regression framework with up to 
3 predictors. This sample size also provided sufficient power in a mixed model ANOVA with 
one within-subject factor and one between-subject factor, assuming a medium effect of .25.  
However, twelve out of eighty seven participants were discarded from further analyses 
because they knew the confederate (n = 2), knew the study hypotheses (n = 6), had missing audio 
data (n = 3) or did not give permission to use their video data (n = 1). The final sample of 75 
young adults consisted of 26 males and 49 females between the ages of 18 and 37 (M = 20.67; 
SD = 3.56). The ethnic composition of the participants was: 62 Caucasian, 6 African American, 2 
Hispanic American, 2 Asian American, 1 Pacific Islander and 2 self-identified as “Others” (from 
Jamaica and Saudi Arabia, respectively). Majority of the participants were college freshmen or 
sophomores (20% and 42.7%, respectively), 26.7% were juniors, 8.3% was seniors, and 1.3% 
were graduate students who took an undergraduate psychology class. They were told that all of 
their information would be kept confidential and that they would have the right to withdraw from 
the study at any time without penalty. Additional demographics for the sample are shown in 
Table 1. 
 Procedure 
 Participants signed up for the study via the online subject recruitment system (Sona). 
They were given various timeslot options and could sign up for a particular lab session. 
Participants came into the lab at the appointed time and were informed that the study examined 
the effect of past experiences on judgment of facial expressions.  
At the beginning of the study, participants completed the consent form that briefly 
described the study procedure and participant’s rights. After they signed the consent form, they 
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were asked to provide their basic demographic information (e.g., age, race, gender, year in 
college, college major, country of origin, first language), report on their psychological 
functioning (i.e., current and past history of psychological disorders and history of physical 
abuse), and complete three additional questionnaires online at the Survey Monkey site. The 
questionnaires assessed participants’ self-reported current mood, their attachment style, and their 
family expressiveness of emotions. The family expressiveness questionnaires were part of an 
undergraduate honor thesis study. Therefore, these will not be discussed further.  
After filling out the questionnaires, participants completed a baseline emotion perception 
task on a designated computer. In this task, participants were presented with a series of 20 faces 
(4 happy, 3 anger, 3 neutral, 4 surprise, 3 sad, and 3 fear) and after each one, they had to indicate 
the displayed emotion out of a list of possible choices (happy, sad, surprise, anger, fear, neutral) 
and rate how intense the emotion seemed. If their answer choice was “neutral”, they would rate 
the valence instead of the intensity of the emotion. Following this task was the mood induction 
during which participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: positive event 
recall and negative event recall, which aimed at inducing positive affect and negative affect, 
respectively. Participants in the positive-event group were asked to recall a recent, positive 
experience and describe it to the experimenter, whereas those in the negative-event group were 
asked to recall a recent, upsetting event. Their responses were audiotaped. Afterwards, 
participants took a brief mood survey as a manipulation check for the effectiveness of the mood 
induction. Then, they completed another emotion perception task in which they saw 52 
emotional faces (10 happy, 7 anger, 11 neutral, 7 sad, 10 surprise, and 7 fear) one at a time. After 
each stimulus, they were asked to determine the displayed emotion out of a list of possible 
choices and indicate the intensity or the valence of the emotions. 
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Upon their completion of the emotion perception task, the experimenter said to the 
participants “The study is almost over. But I have to take a look at your data before you leave. 
Meanwhile, I would like you to fill out the last survey online. I will be back in a few minutes.” 
After the participants completed the last brief mood survey, a same-sex confederate pretended to 
came into the experiment room by accident. All confederates were kept blind to the experimental 
conditions. The confederate then asked the participants for permission to enter the room. Once 
he/she had the permission, the confederate introduced him/herself as another researcher in the lab 
and attempted to initiate a social conversation with the participant by making some standard 
icebreaker comments. Then, the confederate asked the participant for a favor in completing a 
simple task. What the confederate says and does were scripted and kept standardized across 
participants. Should the confederates know the participants from school or work, they would still 
serve as the confederate, but the resulted observation would be discarded in further analysis. This 
part of the study lasted for 2 minutes and was videotaped, without the participants being aware, 
for later coding of social interaction between the participants and the confederate. Due to a 
technical issue of recording the voice with the video camera situated outside the experiment 
room, we recorded the conversations with a microphone hid inside the confederate’s pocket. The 
resulting audio tapes were synchronized with the corresponding video tapes by an undergraduate 
research assistant for later coding. After the 2-minute interval, the experimenter returned to the 
room and told the participants that the study was over. Participants were thanked and fully 
debriefed. Specifically, they were informed of the true purpose of the study (to investigate how 
emotions/mood might affect people’s judgment about others’ emotions and their social 
interaction) and were told that the interaction was videotaped for the purpose of later coding. 
Confederates remained in the experiment room during the debriefing to validate the 
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experimenter’s explanation of the true purpose of the study. Participants were given an additional 
consent form regarding the use of their video data. They were all given the option of 
withdrawing their consent for our use of any or all of their data, and they were asked not to share 
the true purpose of the study with other students.  Participants were also given the option to view 
their own video before they signed the video consent form at the end of the experiment. 
Materials 
Demographic and psychological functioning information This set of questions 
(Appendix A) consisted of a variety of background and demographic measures, including age, 
gender, race, country of origin, first language, year in college, college major, history of mood 
disorders, and physical abuse. History of mood disorders was included for all participants 
because previous or current diagnosis might complicate our analysis and we only want to look at 
the effect of normal variations of mood in currently healthy people. It is important to consider 
history of physical abuse because past research revealed that maltreated individuals showed 
atypical processing of emotions, thus might affect people’s accuracy in the emotion perception 
task (Masten, et al., 2008). However, the question on physical abuse was added late, and thus, 
will not be included in further analyses. 
 Mood assessment Participants completed a self-reported measure of mood state (BMIS; 
Mayer, & Gaschke, 1988) at three time points: (1) at the beginning of the experiment, (2) 
immediately after event recall, but before the experimental task of emotion perception, and (3) 
immediately after completing the emotion perception task.  The scale lists 16 feeling states (e.g., 
lively, happy, sad, fed up, drowsy and active) on a 4-point Likert scale (1=definitely do not 
feeling, and 4 =definitely feel). The scale has been used in several studies to check the 
effectiveness of manipulation of mood states (Innes-Ker, & Niedenthal, 2002; Niedenthal et al., 
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2001; Niedenthal and Setterlund, 1994; Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Mayer, Allen, & 
Beauregard, 1995). Following Mayer and Gaschke (1988) scoring instructions, positive mood 
state was indicated by averaging participants’ ratings of happy, content, active, lively, peppy, 
calm, caring, and loving, whereas negative mood state was indicated by averaging their ratings 
on sad, gloomy, tired, drowsy, fed up, grouchy, jittery, and nervous. The BMIS has been shown 
to have good internal reliability for measuring positive and negative mood states (with 
Cronbach’s α = 0.86 and 0.86 respectively; Ishii, Miyamoto, Niedenthal, & Mayama, 2011).  In 
present study, the reliability of BMIS ranged from .74 to .82. See Appendix B for the BMIS. 
 Attachment orientation  To assess the global attachment pattern of the participants as a 
potential covariate, the participants were asked to complete the revised Experiences in Close 
Relationship Questionnaire (ECR-R; Fraley, Waller, &Brennan, 2000) at the beginning of the 
study. This questionnaire contains 36 items designed to assess attachment-related avoidance and 
anxiety in close relationships. Example items are “I am nervous when my partners get too close 
to me” for the avoidance scale, and “My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away” 
for the anxiety scale. Participants rated each item on the ECR-R questionnaire on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Both avoidance scale (α = .93) and anxiety scale (α = .90) showed 
high internal consistency in present study. A copy of the ECR-R is shown in Appendix C. 
 Mood Induction To manipulate the mood state of participants, they were randomly 
assigned to one of the two groups: positive event recall and negative event recall. Participants 
were asked to describe a happy and an upsetting event, respectively. Recalling emotional episode 
has been used in previous studies to induce emotions (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). A copy of 
the scripts for positive event recall and negative event recall is shown in Appendix D. Examples 
of positive events included family reunion and academic achievement or extra-curriculum 
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accomplishment. For negative events, some recalled events tended to be more intense than the 
others. For instance, one participant disclosed a recent murder in the immediate family. Other 
topics of negative events typically involved natural death of a significant other or conflict with 
friends. When the participants became too upset during the event recall (e.g., cried during the 
recall), the experimenter offered comfort as needed and asked if they wanted to continue the 
study. All participants chose to complete all the procedures in the present study. At the end of the 
study, participants were given a referral sheet with contact information of local counseling 
services.  
 Emotion perception task. The task was delivered using PXLab software (Irtel, 2007) on 
a designated laptop. We used 72 black-and-white stimuli from P. Ekman’s database of facial 
expression photographs (Ekman, & Friesen, 1976). Stimuli contained 14 happy, 10 anger, 14 
neutral, 10 sad, 14 surprise and 10 fear facial expressions. Not all photographs from the database 
were selected. The discarded photographs either display poser whose eyes gazed downward (in 2 
sad stimuli) or show poser who display the same emotion for more than once. In the latter case, 
the stimuli with higher inter-rater reliability according to Ekman and Friesen (1976) were 
retained. Twenty faces were used in the baseline session and fifty-two in the experimental 
session after mood induction.  
 In both sessions, the face stimuli were presented one at a time at the center of the 
computer screen for a fixed duration of 800ms. This duration of time was adjusted from the 
500ms used in Chepenik, Cornew and Farah (2007) to allow enough time for the participants to 
make identification as well as intensity judgment. Each face stimulus was preceded by a fixation 
cross of the same duration to direct the participants’ attention to the center of the computer 
screen. For each stimulus, the participants were instructed to respond to a force-choice question 
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regarding the type of emotion displayed by the face and to indicate their perceived intensity of 
the emotion on a graphic rating scale (ranged from 0 to 10) consisting of a line with not at all 
intense and extremely intense printed at the opposite ends. If the participants chose “neutral” for 
their answer, they were asked to indicate the valence of the emotion on a graph rating scale 
(range from -10 to 10) with negative and positive printed at the opposite ends. In the 
experimental session, the face stimuli were presented in standard order such that neither the 
poser nor the same emotion would appear consecutively. For the purpose of the study, happy and 
surprise were grouped as positively-valenced emotions whereas sad, anger, and fear were 
grouped as negatively-valenced emotions. Although the emotion of surprise is generally 
considered as neutral, some studies suggested that it could be categorized as a positive emotion 
(e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Waugh & Fredrickson, 2006). Participants’ accuracy of emotion 
recognition and perceived intensity of positive and negative emotions were computed separately, 
yielding 2 mean measures (accuracy and intensity rating) for each valence of emotions. See 
Appendix E for examples of Ekman photos and the questions used in the emotion perception 
task. 
 Social interaction task. After the completion of the emotion perception task, the 
participant was left in the experiment room with a same-sex confederate for a 2-minute interval. 
Three female and one male confederate were trained to deliver the social interaction script.  The 
confederate entered the room and introduced him/herself as another researcher in the lab. Then, 
the confederate launched a series of scripted icebreaker comments in an attempt to initiate a 
social conversation with the participants. Also, the confederate asked participants for a favor. 
Following the work of Schachter and Singer (1962), the confederate’s act was broken down into 
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a series of standard units, demarcated by a change in activity or a standard comment. In 
sequence, the confederate delivered the following script: 
1. Confederate enters the room and says “Oh, I am sorry. I didn’t realize that someone is 
in this room. Are you here for the psychology study?” 
2. As the participant replies, the confederate asks “Is it over?” 
i. If the participant says “yes/I think so/probably”, the confederate replies 
“OK, good. I just need a table to sort this stack of articles. Would you 
mind if I sit here?” 
ii. If the participants says “no/I don’t think so”, the confederate responds 
“Let me check with someone? (Then, the confederate pretends to check 
with the experimenter who says “yeah, that’s fine, we’re done.”). After the 
experimenter responds, the confederate turns to the participant and says “I 
need a table to sort this stack of articles, would you mind if I sit here?” 
3. Once having the permission, the confederate will sit down and say “By the way, I 
am one of the undergraduate researchers in this lab. So, how was the study?”  
4. The confederate says “I need to alphabetize this stack of articles by the authors’ 
last name. Can you help me out? You don’t have to. No pressure” 
5. If the participant agrees to help, the confederate will give the participant the stack 
of approximately 10 articles to sort. If the participant refuses to help, the confederate 
will sort the articles by him/herself. In either case, the confederate then asks the 
participant “Are you a psychology major?” 




7. As the participant responds, the confederate says “How are they going?” 
 
  The social interaction between participants and the confederate were coded by two 
trained undergraduate coders. One independent coder coded all 75 videos, and another coder 
coded 24% (n=18) of randomly selected videos to establish inter-coder reliability. The author 
decided not to do the coding because of inconsistencies with the other coder and due to the 
possibility of subjective biases she may bring due to her role as the primary experimenter. The 
coding instructions are shown in Appendix F. Participants’ behaviors were coded on the 
following categories or dimensions. 
 Agreeableness. First, the coders recorded whether the participant let the confederate into 
the room (0 = no; 1 = yes). Because all participants gave permission to the confederate to enter 
the room, the coders agreed perfectly on this variable (kappa = 1). Second, the amount of help 
the participant agreed to give to the confederate will be coded (0 = reject the initial request; 1 = 
help upon initial request, but no further volunteering; 2 = agree to the initial request and offers 
additional help to the confederate after he/she complete the original request). All but one 
participant agreed to help the confederate. The two coders were consistent on this code (kappa = 
1).  Lastly, the coders determined whether the participant responded to standard question 5-7 
(kappa =1 for each code) and recorded the duration of each comment (ICC = .85, p < .001). If the 
participants made comments related to standard question 5-7 before they were being asked, their 
comments would be captured in the “extra comments” categories in the “engagement” 
dimension. In this case, the participants were not asked the standard question(s) because the 
responses were already given.  
 Engagement. The number of times the participants made direct eye contact with the 
confederate (ICC = .91, p < .001) and the duration of each eye contact instance (ICC = .92, p 
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<.001) were summed and recorded across the 2-minute interval.  In addition, the number of times 
that the participant initiated new comments that were irrelevant to the confederate’s questions 
was counted (ICC = .78, p < .001) and the duration was recorded (ICC = .90, p < .001). As 
mentioned above, relevant comments given before the standard questions were asked were also 
coded in this category. The two coders were reliable in coding whether the participants moved 
their chair so sit closer to the confederate (kappa = 1) and whether they cleared the table to make 
room for the confederate (kappa = .77). 
Affect.  Adapted from previous codes of affective behaviors (Gentzler, Wheat, Palmer & 
Burwell, in press), participants’ general affect expressions during the entire interaction were 
coded on 4-point scale, using indices from tone of voice, facial expressions, and body 
movements.  For positive affect, the scales were described as 1 = no positive affect expression, 2 
= slight positive affect (e.g., forced smiles), 3 = moderate positive affect (e.g., at least two weak 
social smiles), and 4 = intense positive affect (genuine smiles, laughing, etc.). Similarly, negative 
affect expressed across the entire interaction were coded for the overall global intensity, where 1 
= no negative affect expression, 2 = slight, low-intense expressions of negative affect (e.g., 
yawning and tired voice), 3 = moderate negative affect (e.g., sighs and slight frowning), and 4 = 
intense expressions of negative affect (e.g., eye-roll or scoff, sarcasm, raised voice). The intra-
class correlations of positive and negative affect were .46 and .62 respectively. 
Manipulation check Two 2 (experimental conditions: positive vs. negative) X 3 (mood 
ratings: baseline vs. after mood induction vs. before social interaction) ANOVAs with the 
experimental condition as the independent variable and participants’ reported mood as the 
dependent variable was conducted as a manipulation check to assess the effectiveness of positive 
and negative mood induction. The interaction between experimental conditions and mood ratings 
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was significant for self-reported positive affect (F = 42.89, p < .001, partial η
2 
= .37), and 
negative affect (F = 16.84, p < .001, partial η
2 
= .19), indicating that the mood ratings differed 
across experimental conditions. See Figure 1a and 1b for the mood ratings by conditions for 
positive mood and negative mood, respectively. The main effects of condition were not 
significant for positive mood ratings (F = 1.87, p = .18, partial η
2 
= .03) and negative mood 
ratings (F = 2.84, p = .10, partial η
2 
= .04). Contrast analyses showed that participants reported 
significantly higher levels of positive mood after positive mood induction (M = 3.08), compared 
to baseline (M = 2.89), F contrast (1, 37) = 9.87, p < .001, partial η
2 
= .21. However, their self-
reported positive mood before social interaction (M = 2.87) returned to approximately baseline 
level (M = 2.89), in the positive mood condition, F contrast (1, 37) = .154, p = .70, partial η
2 
= 
.001. Participants in the positive mood condition also reported less negative mood after positive 
mood induction (M = 1.78), compared to baseline, (M = 2.03), F contrast (1, 37) = 19.21, p < 
.001, partial η
2 
= .34. Their self-reported negative mood before social interaction (M = 1.81) was 




On the other hand, participants in the negative mood condition reported significantly 
lower levels of positive mood (M = 2.58) after negative mood induction, compared to baseline 
(M = 3.08), F contrast (1, 36) = 53.55, p < .001, partial η
2 
= .60. Their self-reported positive 
mood before social interaction (M = 2.77) was also significantly lower than their baseline level 
(M = 3.08), F contrast (1, 36) = 37.74, p < .001, partial η
2 
= .51. They also reported significantly 
high levels of negative mood after negative mood induction (M = 2.20), compared to baseline (M 
= 1.95), F contrast (1, 36) = 10.73, p < .001, partial η
2 
= .23. However, their self-reported 
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negative mood before social interaction (M = 1.96) returned to baseline level (M = 1.95), F 
contrast (1, 36) = .01, p = .91, partial η
2 
= .001.   
Because 3 different female and one male confederate were used and the confederates’ 
appearance or other characteristics might influence the behaviors of the participants, a 
manipulation check was conducted to determine if participants’ social interaction style differ by 
confederates. The results from the univariate ANOVA analyses revealed no main effect of 
confederate on all of the social interaction variables, suggesting that the participants did not 
behave differently based on which confederate they interacted with. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
 Variables of interest were screened for missing data, outliers, and violations of normality. 
Since mood induction was expected to have an effect on participants’ self-reported mood, 
missing values on the mood rating scales were imputed with the corresponding group means by 
conditions. For example, if the rating of happy was omitted by one of the participants in the 
positive mood condition, this missing value would be replaced with the average rating of happy 
in the positive mood condition. The same replacing rule also applied to negative mood ratings. 
Missing values on the attachment scales were replaced with the corresponding means across 
conditions. There was an outlier in the baseline and post-induction valence ratings of neutral 
stimuli, indicating that one participant gave unusually high ratings to neutral stimuli, compared 
to other participants.  The outliers were replaced with the group mean by conditions. With 
perception task accuracy, participants were generally accurate in identifying emotions. In 
particular, their accuracy of recognizing positive emotions (i.e., happy and surprise), anger and 
neutral emotion were negatively skewed. Transformations of variables did not improve the 
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violation of normality issue. Therefore, the raw scores of these variables were retained for further 
analyses. Means and standard deviations of study variables are shown in Table 2.  
 Preliminary analyses with gender revealed that there was no significant gender 
difference in any of the perception task variables. Bivariate correlations suggested that the age of 
participants was negatively related to accuracy of recognizing fear (r = -.24, p = .04), and 
positively related to perceived intensity of positive (r = .27, p = .02) and negative emotions (r = 
.31, p = .01), and valence ratings of neutral emotions (r = .24, p =.04) during the emotion 
perception task. Examination of scatter plots suggested that these trends were not attributed to an 
outlier. Independent sample t-tests revealed racial differences in baseline perceived intensity of 
sadness (t(73) = -2.43, p = .02), baseline perceived valence of neutral stimuli (t(73) = -2.16, p 
=.03), and accuracy in recognizing negative emotions during the post mood induction emotion 
perception task (t(73) = 2.04, p = .05). These results suggested that non-Caucasian American 
participants perceived sadness as more intense but rated neutral stimuli as more positive at 
baseline, compared to Caucasian American. They were also less accurate in recognizing negative 
emotions during the post mood induction emotion perception task. Because the question on 
physical abuse was only administered to half of the participants and there were only 5 cases 
(N=41) reporting history of physical abuse, this variable was not examined. 
Bivariate correlations also indicated that avoidant attachment was negatively related to 
accuracy of recognizing neutral stimuli (r = -.23, p = .05) after mood induction. However, when 
the correlations were analyzed by experimental conditions, anxious attachment was positively 
correlated with accuracy of recognizing negative emotions (r = .33, p = .04), especially fear (r = 
.37, p = .02), but avoidance attachment was unrelated to any perception task variables in the 
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positive mood condition. There was no significant correlation between attachment style and 
perception task variables in the negative mood condition.  
Research question 1: Does mood influence one’s perception of facial expression? 
Hypothesis 1a. A mixed-model ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis that the mood 
of the participants would lead to higher accuracy in identifying mood-congruent face stimuli, 
relative to mood-incongruent ones. The within-subjects factor was the valence of emotional 
stimuli (positive vs. negative). The between-subjects factor was the types of mood induction 
(positive vs. negative). In contrast to our expectation, the results revealed that there was no 
significant interaction of emotion valence by mood induction, F (1, 73) = .002, p = .96, partial η
2
 
= .001. The main effect of mood induction was also non-significant, F (1, 73) = .006, p = .94, 
partial η
2
 = .001. However, the main effect of emotion valence was significant, F (1, 73) = 
132.09, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .64), such that participants were more accurate in recognizing 
positive emotions (M = .97; SD =.05) than negative emotions (M =.77; SD = .14), regardless of 
mood induction. Means and standard deviations of the measures were shown in Table 2. 
Hypothesis 1b. We performed a mixed model ANOVA to examine mood effects on 
perceived intensity of emotions. We hypothesize that people would perceive mood-congruent 
expressions as more intense and mood-incongruent expressions as less intense. The within-
subject factor was the valence of emotion displayed by the face stimuli (positive vs. negative). 
The between-subject factor was types of mood induction (positive vs. negative). Results showed 
that there was neither significant interaction effect of emotion valence by mood induction, F (1, 
73) = .10, p = .75, partial η
2
 = .001, nor main effect of mood induction, F (1, 73) = .29, p = .59, 
partial η
2
 = .001. Nonetheless, there was a significant main effect of emotion valence, F (1, 73) = 
84.51, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .54, such that participants generally perceived positive emotions (M 
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= 6.47; SD = 1.30) as more intense than negative emotions (M = 5.47; SD = 1.52). Means and 
standard deviations of the measures were shown in Table 2. Summary of the mixed-model 
ANOVA analyses was presented in Table 3. 
Hypothesis 1c. To test the hypothesis that emotionally-aroused participants would 
attribute their own mood or similar-valenced affects to neutral face stimuli after mood induction, 
we run an ANOVA to compare participants’ accuracy in identifying neutral faces and perceived 
valence of neutral stimuli from the baseline test and the experimental test. Results revealed a 
non-significant trend that the participants were less accurate in recognizing neutral emotions 
after mood induction, F (1, 73) = .20, p = .66, partial η
2
 = .001 (Mbaseline accuracy = .88; SD =.20; M 
post mood induction accuracy= .86; SD = .15). However, there was a significant main effect of condition, 
F (1, 73) = 5.65, p = .02, partial η
2
 = .07, indicating that people in the positive mood condition 
were more accurate in recognizing neutral stimuli (Mpositive condition = .91; SD =.13; Mnegative condition 
= .83; SD =.20). With regard to perceived valence of neutral stimuli, the results suggested that 
participants rated the valence of neutral face as more negative after mood induction, F (1, 73) 
=21.52, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .23 (Mbasline valence = .42; SD = 1.42; Mpost mood induction valence = -.52; SD 
= 1.13), regardless of the experimental conditions (See Table 4). 
Research question 2: Does biased perception of facial expression affect social interaction? 
 Concerning data aggregation for the social interaction task, there were 5 categorical 
codes in the agreeableness scale: whether participants let the confederate in, the extent to which 
they help the confederate, and whether they responded to each of the 3 standard questions.  
Almost all participants helped and responded to the confederate to some extent. In some cases, 
the confederate did not deliver all the standard questions because the participants already 
addressed a later question in their responses to the previous standard question(s), making the 
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standard question codes invalid. Due to the lack of variability and the associated validity issues 
in the agreeableness codes, they were not analyzed further. Instead, the duration of participants’ 
responses to the standard questions were summed and used as the index of agreeableness in 
further analysis. 
For the similar reasons, the move-chair and the clear-table codes would be excluded in 
further analyses. Only 2 participants moved their chair, resulting in lack of variability in this 
code. Although there were 28 participants (37.3%) who cleared the table to make room for the 
confederate, the majority of the participants did not have their personal belongings on the table 
so the code was invalid in a sense that it did not apply to some of the participants. Therefore, the 
count and duration of eye contact and additional comments were the only variables retained as 
indices of engagement. These were analyzed as separate variables because the variables were 
only moderately correlated at the most (range -.23 to .78; see Table 5). 
 The count and duration of participants’ response to standard questions, their eye contact 
with the confederate, and initiation of additional comments were positively skewed. These 
variables were recomputed with square-root transformation for further analyses. Negative affect 
was also positively skewed because only four participants were coded as having a negative affect 
score higher than 2 (i.e., slight, low-intense expressions of negative affect). Despite the lack of 
variability in this variable, it was retained in further analyses because it reflected the affective 
behaviors of the participants.  
Hypothesis 2a. Bivariate correlations suggested that age, gender, race and attachment 
style were unrelated to any of the social interaction variables. Therefore, they were not included 
as controlling variables in the ANOVA analyses conducted to test the hypothesis that 
participants in the positive mood condition would show more initiative behaviors, make more 
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eye contact with the confederate, and exhibit more positive affect during the social interaction, 
compared to those in the negative mood condition. The results revealed a significant main effect 
of condition on positive affect, F (1, 73) = 5.13, p = .03, partial η
2
 = .07 and total number of 
additional comments, F (1, 73) = 5.73, p = .02, partial η
2
 = .07. Specifically, participants in the 
positive mood condition exhibited more positive affect, but initiated less additional comments 
than participants in the negative mood condition. There was also a nonsignificant trend that those 
in the positive mood condition gave lengthier responses to the standard questions, F (1, 73) = 
3.57, p = .06, partial η
2
 = .05. No other significant differences were found. Descriptive statistics 
for the retained social interaction variables are shown in Table 6. 
Hypothesis 2b. To test the moderation hypothesis that those who rated mood-congruent 
faces as more intense would be more susceptible to the mood effect on social interaction, a series 
of linear regression analyses were conducted on the social interaction variables. Participants’ 
ratings of perceived intensity of positive and negative emotions were centered. Two interaction 
terms were created for experimental conditions by perceived intensity of positive and negative 
emotions, respectively. Summaries of the analyses are shown in Table 7 and Table 8. 
Specifically, no significant interaction was found. However, perceived intensity of negative 
emotions predicted the total number and duration of eye contact. Those who perceived negative 
emotions as more intense made more eye contact with the confederate for a longer duration of 
time. There was no significant main effect of perceived intensity of positive emotions (happy 
and/or surprise).  Follow up linear regression analyses were performed to delineate any emotion-
specific effect of perceived intensity of anger, sadness and fear on eye contact during social 
interaction. The results revealed that those who perceived fear as more intense tended to make 
more eye contact with the confederate, B = .11, SE = .05, p = .02, for a longer duration, B = .26, 
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SE = .10, p =.01.  Perceived intensity of anger only predicted more eye contact, B =.11, SE = .05, 
p = .05, but were unrelated to duration of eye contact. No significant result was found with 
perceived intensity of sadness.  
As we did not find significant association between experimental condition and perceived 
intensity of emotions, one of the essential conditions for testing the mediation model was not 
met. Therefore, the mediation analysis was not performed. 
Exploratory analyses 
 Because the perception task accuracy variables were highly skewed, we dichotomized all 
the accuracy variables (1 = all correct; 0 = get one or more questions wrong) and performed Chi-
Square analyses to see if participants’ accuracy of recognizing emotions differ by experimental 
conditions. No significant results were found from these tests. Therefore, we decided to report on 
the mixed-model ANOVA results, using the untransformed, continuous variables of perception 
task accuracy. 
 Preliminary analyses revealed age differences in perceived intensity of emotions (both 
positive and negative) and race differences in accuracy of recognizing negative emotions. 
Therefore, additional mix-model ANOVA analyses were performed with age and race as control 
variables. Race was dichotomized (1 = Caucasian American; 2 = non-Caucasian American). The 
results revealed a significant valence by race interaction on perception task accuracy, F (1, 70) = 
4.42, p =.04, partial η
2
 = .06. Non-Caucasian American participants performed poorer in 
recognizing negative emotions than positive emotions, compared to their Caucasian American 
counterparts (See Figure 2). In addition, there was a nonsignificant trend that, after controlling 
for age and race, participants in the negative mood condition perceived neutral stimuli as more 
negative after the mood induction, compared to those in the positive mood condition, F (1, 70) = 
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3.70, p = .06, partial η
2
 = .05 (See Figure 3). No other interaction was significant. When 
attachment styles were included in the models, the patterns of results were similar. Therefore, we 
chose to report the statistics from the mixed-model ANOVA analyses with only age and race as 
covariate. 
 For exploratory purpose, the effect of baseline mood on emotion perception at baseline 
was examined using linear regression analyses with baseline reported positive and negative 
mood as predictor variables, controlling for age and race. Baseline recognition accuracy and 
perceived intensity of the emotional stimuli were included as the outcome variables. It was 
shown that baseline negative mood predicted lower accuracy of recognizing neutral stimuli, over 
and above the effect of age and race, B = -.15, SE = .05, p = .01. The effects of self-reported 
mood on emotion perception after mood induction were also examined, controlling for age and 
race. The results revealed that self-reported positive mood after mood induction  predicted higher 
accuracy of recognizing neutral stimuli, above and beyond the effect of age and race, B = .09, SE 
= .04, p = .03. Finally, self-reported mood assessed before the social interaction tasks were also 
examined in relation to the social interaction variables in a series of linear regression analyses, 
controlling for age and race. It was found that self-reported positive mood before the social 
interaction task predicted more eye contact incidences with the confederate, B = .40, SE = .17, p 
= .02. No other significant result was found in these exploratory analyses. 
Discussion 
Mood effect on recognition accuracy of emotions 
 The first goal of the study was to investigate the effects of different mood states (positive 
and negative) on young adults’ ability to correctly recognize others’ emotions and their 
perceived intensity of those emotions. We hypothesized a mood-congruity effect on emotion 
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perception, such that participants would be more accurate in recognizing mood-congruent 
emotions and would rate them as more intense than mood-incongruent ones (Hypothesis 1a and 
1b). The overall findings revealed no significant differences in perception task accuracy and 
perceived intensity of positive and negative emotions across the two experimental conditions. 
Although our results did not support the mood-congruent effect on emotion perception, our 
findings were consistent with past literature in two aspects. First, in line with past research on 
perception of emotional expressions (e.g., Lee et al., 2008; Schmid & Mast, 2010), there was no 
evidence for an overall performance decrement among the current sample of healthy young adult 
in the negative mood condition, suggesting that negative mood did not impair general perception 
of emotional expressions in healthy individuals as it did in depressed individuals (e.g., Persad & 
Polivy, 1993; Surguladze et al., 2004). Second, results were also consistent with previous 
research in that positive emotions were easier to recognize correctly, than negative emotions 
(Ellis et al., 1997; Surguladze et al., 2004; Trevisani et al., 2008).  
There were several factors that could explain our null findings on emotion recognition 
accuracy. For example, there was ceiling effects in emotion recognition performance of 
happiness, surprise and anger. The overall rates of accuracy were 99.1%, 94.4%, and 94.9%, 
respectively. The high rates of accuracy and the lack of variability in positive emotion 
recognition performance reduced the sensitivity of our experiment in finding a mood-congruity 
effect in emotion perception accuracy.  
The presentation time (800ms) of each emotional stimulus in the present study could also 
account for the high recognition performance in our participants. Past research indicated that 
healthy participants were able to correctly identify facial expressions of emotions presented for 
duration as brief as 100ms to 200ms (Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, & Matsumura, 2001; 
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Surguladze et al, 2004). The presentation duration of 800ms in the present study might make the 
recognition task too easy for our participants, although it gave them enough time to make 
judgment about perceived intensity of the emotions.  
Mood effect on perceived intensity of emotions 
To our knowledge, little research has focused on the effect of mood on perceived 
intensity of emotions (for exception, see Schiffenbauer, 1974). The present study addressed this 
gap in the literature. However, the findings did not support the intensity hypothesis that 
participants would perceive mood-congruent emotions as more intense and mood-incongruent 
emotions as less intense. Instead, our results suggested that young adults perceived positive 
emotions as more intense than negative emotions, regardless of their current mood state. One 
explanation for these results could be that facial features indicative of positive emotions (happy 
and surprise) are generally more salient than those that characterize negative emotions (Calvo & 
Nummenmaa, 2011). Salient facial features, such as an upturned mouth (as in a happy 
expression) might have appeared more intense to the participants. In support of this 
interpretation, research on infant smiling provides empirical support for a positive association 
between young adults’ perceived intensity of infant smiles and the degree of smile strength and 
mouth opening on an infant’s face (Messinger, Cassel, Acosta, Ambadar, & Cohn, 2008), 
suggesting that salience of facial features affects perceived intensity of emotions. Thus, because 
participants generally tended to perceive positive emotions as more intense than negative 
emotions due to the salience of facial features of positive emotions, this tendency may have 
washed out the hypothesized mood-congruity effect on perceived intensity of emotions.
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Mood-congruity effect on emotion perception 
In contrast to previous studies with young adults, the present study failed to show a direct 
link between mood and emotion perception. Our results did not provide evidence for the mood-
congruity effect reported in past literature (e.g., Lee et al., 2008; Schmid & Mast, 2010) as 
participants in the positive mood and negative mood conditions did not differ significantly in 
their emotion recognition accuracy and perceived intensity of emotions. There are at least two 
possible explanations for our nonsignificant findings. First of all, the present study did not 
manipulate the intensity of the facial expressions depicted in our stimuli. The Ekman photos 
depicted prototypical expressions of basic emotions. The posers were instructed to activate 
certain facial muscles associated with various emotional expressions in a way that makes the 
expressions as discernible as possible (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Therefore, the facial 
expressions in the Ekman face database tend to be of high intensity. Past research has shown that 
high intensity facial emotions were easier to correctly identify than low intensity facial 
expressions (Schmid & Mast, 2010). Because the stimuli in the present study were relatively 
easier to recognize, the resulting ceiling effects may have reduced the sensitivity of our 
experiment. Future research may consider varying the intensity of the face stimuli using face 
morphing software (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2002; Schmid & Mast, 2010). 
In addition, the use of a wide range of facial expressions (happy, sad, neutral, anger, 
surprise, and fear) may have washed out the expected mood-congruity effects. Likewise, Schmid 
and colleagues (2011) used 4 different types of emotional facial expressions and did not find a 
mood-congruity effect on emotion recognition accuracy in their study. On the other hand, 
Schmid and Mast (2010) only used happy and sad expressions and reported that sad participants 
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recognized sad facial expressions better than happy ones, indicating a mood-congruity effect in 
the negative mood condition.  
Mood and perception of neutral expressions 
Concerning the perception of neutral stimuli, emotionally-aroused participants did not 
perform worse in recognizing neutral expressions after mood induction, although there was a 
trend. Consistent with Surguladze et al. (2004), we also found that participants in the negative 
mood condition were more likely to misidentify neutral expressions as emotional, compared to 
those in the positive mood condition. This perceptual bias reflected a tendency toward labeling 
neutral expressions as negative emotions rather than positive ones. Additionally, participants 
tended to perceive neutral face as more negative when they were emotionally-aroused (after 
mood induction). These results suggest that being emotionally-aroused, especially in a negative 
mood, may make people more susceptible to misattribution of neutral expressions as emotional. 
Such tendencies could be problematic if an agitated person attributes his/her own negative 
emotions to a rather calm individual and therefore acts aggressively toward that individual, 
leading to tension between the two.  
The roles of mood and emotion perception in social interaction 
Given the importance of emotion perception in guiding our social behaviors (Keltner & 
Kring, 1998), the second goal of the present study was to examine if the perception of other’s 
emotions plays a role in how mood influences the subsequent behaviors of the perceivers. We 
hypothesized that participants in the positive mood condition would be more agreeable to help 
and more engaging in the social conversation, and show more positive affect but less negative 
affect during the social interaction with a stranger, compared to those in the negative mood 
condition. We also expected that those who rate mood-congruent stimuli as more intense would 
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be more susceptible to the mood effect on social interaction. The results provided some support 
that the mood states of the participants impacted certain aspects of their social interaction. More 
specifically, those who were in the positive mood condition exhibited more positive affect, 
although they also initiated fewer additional comments. One explanation could be that these 
individuals tended to give lengthier responses to the standard questions, which left them with 
little time to initiate new comments that were irrelevant to the standard questions. These findings 
are in line with past research that suggests positive mood may activate behaviors with a positive 
valence (Batson et al., 1979; Isen, 1970). However, contrast to these previous studies, we found 
that participants in the present study were equally likely to offer help to the confederate, 
regardless of their mood states. Such discrepancy could be attributed to the methodological 
difference between the present study and the previous ones. In this study, the participants were 
explicitly asked by the confederate to help with a simple task, whereas in the past studies, 
participants were given opportunity to help by putting money in a donation box in the 
experiment room (Isen, 1970) or intervening a staged non-emergency situation (Batson et al., 
1979). Therefore, our participants might be more obligated to help due to social desirability, 
even when they were in a relatively negative mood. Therefore, the study could be improved by 
using a less explicit helping task that requires more initiative from the participants (e.g., putting 
money in a donation box or returning a found electronic device to the experimenter).  
In addition, we did not find support for the moderating effect of emotion perception on 
mood and social interaction, suggesting that the condition effect was not dependent on 
participants’ emotion perception. However, there was evidence that perceived intensity of 
negative emotions was predictive of the amount and duration of the participants’ direct eye 
contact during social interaction. More precisely, those who perceived fearful expressions as 
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more intense tended to maintain more eye contacts with the confederate for a longer duration of 
time. This finding fit with previous studies that fear-prone individuals show heightened 
unconscious vigilance to social and emotional cues when they are emotionally-aroused 
(Nidenthal, Brauer, Robin & Innes-Ker, 2002; Putman, Hermans, & Honk, 2006). This vigilance 
may reflect the defensiveness of fear-prone individuals to detect potential threats/challenges in 
their environment so as to prepare themselves to deal with any uncertainty (Holbrook, Sousa, & 
Hahn-Holbrook, 2001). In this sense, those who perceived fearful expression as more intense in 
the present study might be prone to the vigilance associated with fear arousal, and thus, tended to 
maintain more eye contacts with the confederate for a longer time in search for more social cues 
to make sense of the uncertain situation. On the other hand, perceived intensity of anger was also 
predictive of more eye contact with the confederate in the current sample. Limited research has 
shown that anger arousal might prime a sense of dominance in human, leading to more gaze 
behaviors in face-to-face confrontations (Ellsworth & Carlsmith, 1973; Terburg, Hooiveld, 
Aarts, Leon Kenemans, & van Honk, 2011). In the context of the present study, those who 
perceived anger as more intense might be prone to anger arousal, and thus, make more eye 
contact with the confederate as a way to express their dominance in the face-to-face social 
interaction. 
Discussion of the exploratory findings 
In the exploratory analyses, the results revealed that older participants generally 
perceived positive and negative emotions as more intense, compared to younger participants. 
Age differences have been found in a sample of children and adolescents, with young 
adolescents perceived negative emotions as more intense, compared to pre-adolescent children 
(van Beek & Dubas, 2008). However, the corresponding finding in the present study should be 
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interpreted with caution because van Beek and Dubas (2008) reported age differences in 
perceived intensity of emotional stimuli across two developmental periods, namely late 
childhood and early adolescence, during which there are important improvements in emotional 
knowledge and experiences. Therefore, adolescents may perceive others’ emotional expressions 
as more intense because they become increasingly aware of the fact that people may suppress or 
hide their emotions so the actual intensity of other’s emotions may be higher than what are 
expressed. Because we did not specifically recruit participants from different age groups, 
replications of the current finding are needed to determine whether the age differences found in 
the present study reflect the normative development in emotional understanding or simply 
experimental artifact. 
In addition to the age differences, there was also a valence by race interaction effect on 
recognition accuracy of emotional expressions in the current sample. In other words, Caucasian 
and non-Caucasian participants performed comparably well in recognizing positive emotions. 
However, non-Caucasian participants were less accurate in recognizing negative emotions, 
compared to their Caucasian counterparts. Such difference can be attributed to an in-group 
advantage in identifying emotions among the Caucasian participants because the experimental 
stimuli depicted Caucasian faces. In support of this explanation, past research has found that 
perceivers were less accurate in recognizing faces and emotional expressions displayed by 
members of a different racial group, but made fewer errors when they interpret facial expressions 
of members of their own racial group (Johnson & Fredrickson, 2005; Wickline, Bailey, & 
Nowicki, 2009). Due to the ceiling effect in recognition accuracy of positive emotions in the 
current sample, non-Caucasian and Caucasian performed almost equally well in identifying 
positive emotions. However, Caucasian participants seemed to benefit from the in-group 
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advantage in recognizing negative emotions probably because they were more familiar to the 
emotional expressions of members of their own race. 
Limitations and future directions 
Several limitations of the present study are worth noting. First of all, although the 
intended effects of mood manipulation were statistically significant, the some of these effects 
were of small magnitude (partial η
2
 ranged from .19 to .60). Furthermore, the induced mood did 
not last. The present study used event recall as the mood manipulation method in an attempt to 
induce more intense affective reactions because participants might easily relate to personally-
meaningful events. Given the patterns of mood change in the present study, it is plausible that the 
participants might have employed regulatory strategies to down-regulate their affective states so 
the induced mood did not last. In future studies, researchers can play emotional music in the 
background while the participants are completing the experimental task(s) to maintain their 
affective states after the mood manipulation. Second, the study was underpowered to detect 
small effects because of the relatively small sample size. Third, due to the use of prototypical 
emotional face stimuli, the ceiling effect in perception task accuracy reduced the sensitivity in 
detecting the mood-congruity effect in emotion perception. Fourth, the use of a wide range of 
emotional stimuli might have further washed out the mood-congruity effect. Therefore, it is 
plausible that with a larger sample and better control of the physical properties of the face 
stimuli, we may be able to find the expected mood-congruity effect in recognition accuracy and 
perceived intensity of emotions. Fifth, the inter-rater reliability of the affect codes in the social 
interaction task was low. But the coding discrepancies were discussed and addressed in the final 
analyses of the social interaction data. Lastly, there was little variability in the helping behaviors 
and negative affect during the social interaction task. It could be that the participants agreed to 
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help and attempted to suppress their negative affect because of social desirability, regardless of 
their current mood states.  
In sum, the present study did not find mood-congruity effects in recognition accuracy and 
perceived intensity of emotional expressions. However, it contributed to our understanding of 
how moods influence perception of neutral expressions. In particular, negative mood seems to 
impair recognition of neutral stimuli in the current sample, suggesting the people may be prone 
to misattributing their negative emotions to neutral expressions. Emotionally-aroused individuals 
also tended to perceived neutral expressions as more negative, regardless of their mood states. 
Such a tendency may influence the subsequent behaviors of the perceivers as they attribute their 
own emotions to a rather neutral expressor. Although the results from the present study did not 
support the moderating or mediating effects of emotion perception on how mood influences the 
social behaviors of the perceivers, future research may find results in line with our hypotheses 
with improved methodologies such as a large sample size, the use of morphed face stimuli (to 
make the perception task more challenging yet sensitive), and the implementation of a social 
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50.7 38 49.3 37   
Gender       
   Male 42.1 16 27 10 34.7 26 
   Female 57.9 22 73 27 65.3 49 
Race       
   Caucasian 81.6 31 83.8 31 82.6 62 
   African American 7.9 3 8.1 3 8 6 
   Hispanic American 2.6 1 2.7 1 2.7 2 
   Asian American 2.6 1 2.7 1 2.7 2 
   Pacific Islander 2.6 1 0 0 1.3 1 
   Other 2.6 1 2.7 1 2.7 2 
English as first 
language 
      
   Yes 89.5 34 94.6 35 92 69 
   No 10.5 4 5.4 2 8 6 
Year in college       
   Freshman 18.4 7 21.6 8 20 15 
   Sophomore 39.5 15 45.9 17 42.7 32 
   Junior 28.9 11 24.3 9 26.7 20 
   Senior 13.2 5 2.7 1 8 6 
   Graduate student 0 0 2.7 1 1.3 1 
   Did not specify 0 0 2.7 1 1.3 1 
Psychological disorder       
   Yes 2.6 1 0 0 2.7 2 
   No 97.4 37 100 37 97.3 73 
Physical abuse*       
   Yes 4.2 1 23.5 4 12.2 5 
   No 95.8 23 76.5 13 87.8 36 
Confederate       
   1 31.6 12 35.1 13  33.3 25 
   2 42.1 16 27.0 10 34.7 26 
   3 13.2 5 27.0 10 20 15 







Mean and Standard Deviations of Study Measures 








Attachment style    
   Anxious  2.95 (1.03) 2.99 (0.96) 2.97(0.99) 
   Avoidant  3.04 (1.28) 2.84(0.96) 2.94 (1.13) 
    
Baseline accuracy    
  Overall positive  84.7 (11.8) 90.5 (9.50) 90.0 (10.7) 
      Happy  95.4 (9.82) 96.6 (8.67) 96.0 (9.2) 
      Surprise  83.6 (19.5) 84.5 (19.0) 84.0 (19.1) 
   Overall negative  78.1 (17.2) 74.8 (13.8) 76.5 (15.6) 
      Anger 73.7 (22.1) 65.8 (25.4) 69.8 (24.0) 
      Sad  86.0 (25.3) 82.0 (23.0) 84.0 (24.1) 
      Fear  74.6 (28.4) 76.6 (24.7) 75.6 (26.5) 
  Neutral  92.1 (14.4) 83.8 (23.1) 88.0 (19.5) 
Baseline intensity    
   Overall positive  6.98 (1.12) 6.86 (1.41) 6.92 (1.26) 
      Happy  7.70 (1.22) 7.60 (1.31) 7.65 (1.25) 
      Surprise  6.19 (1.46) 6.04 (1.83) 6.11 (1.64) 
   Overall negative  5.24 (1.48) 5.42 (1.68) 5.33 (1.58) 
      Anger  4.67 (1.98) 4.72 (2.20) 4.70 (2.08) 
      Sad  5.02 (1.71) 4.87 (1.98) 4.94 (1.84) 
      Fear  5.94 (1.97) 6.24 (2.22) 6.09 (2.09) 
   Neutral ratings 0.21 (1.39) 0.65 (1.44) 0.42 (1.42) 
Task accuracy    
   Overall positive  96.7 (4.24) 96.8 (5.80) 96.7 (5.00) 
      Happy  99.2 (2.73) 98.9 (3.93) 99.1 (3.40) 
      Surprise 94.2 (8.26) 94.6 (9.89) 94.4 (9.00) 
   Overall negative  76.7 (14.4) 77.0 (13.3) 76.8 (13.8) 
      Anger  95.5 (8.90) 94.2 (12.0) 94.9 (10.5) 
      Sad  70.3 (21.1) 69.5 (21.4) 69.9 (21.1) 
      Fear  64.3 (26.9) 67.4 (23.8) 65.9 (25.3) 
   Neutral 88.9 (12.0) 82.8 (17.4) 85.9 (15.1) 
Perceived intensity    
   Overall positive  6.40 (1.23) 6.54 (1.38) 6.47 (1.30) 
      Happy    7.05 (1.25) 7.19 (1.44) 7.12 (1.34) 
      Surprise  5.69 (1.47) 5.81 (1.70) 5.75 (1.58) 
   Overall negative 5.36 (1.37) 5.57 (1.67) 5.46 (1.52) 
     Anger 5.69 (1.57) 5.87 (1.90) 5.78 (1.73) 
      Sad  4.37 (1.64) 4.48 (1.64) 4.42 (1.63) 
      Fear  5.94 (1.49) 5.87 (2.05) 5.91 (1.78) 
  Neutral ratings -0.19 (2.02) -0.58 (1.17) -0.52 (1.13) 
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Table 3  
 
Mixed-Model ANOVA of Mood-Congruity Effect on Perception Task Accuracy and Perceived Intensity of Emotions 
Source Perception task accuracy Perceived intensity 
df SS MS F p df SS MS F p 
Between-subjects            
    Mood conditions 1 .001 .001 .01 .94 1 1.04 1.04   
Within-subjects            
    Emotion Valence  1 1.48 1.48 132.09* .001 1 37.86 37.86 84.51* .001 
Emotion Valence        
  X Conditions 
1 .001 .001 .001 .96 1 .05 .05 .10 .75 
Error 73 .77 .01   73 32.70 .45   








Mixed-Model ANOVA Analyses on Neutral Accuracy and Perceived Valence on Neutral Stimuli 
 
Source Neutral accuracy Perceived valence of neutral stimuli 
df SS MS F p df SS MS F p 
Between subjects            
    Mood  conditions 1 .19 .19 5.65* .001 1 .04 .04 .01 .91 
Within subjects            
   Pre- and post-   
    induction 
1 .02 .02 .69 .41 1 42.75 42.75 21.52* .001 
   Pre- and post- 
    induction  
     X Conditions 
1 .01 .01 .20 .66 1 .82 .82 .41 .52 
Error 73 1.80 .03   73 145.01 1.99   






Bivariate correlations of Social Interaction Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Mood condition        
2. Response duration .22       
3. Eye contact count -.11 .21      
4. Eye contact duration .13 .35** .78**     
5. Comment count -.26* -.15 .40** .30**    
6. Comment duration -.02 .26* .44** .44** .50**   
7. Positive affect .26* .19 .55** .57** .18 .36**  
8. Negative affect .04 -.16 -.23* -.15 -.05 .08 -.09 
Note. * Significance level at .05; ** Significance level at .01; All values rounded to two decimal places;  






Means and Standard Deviations of Social Interaction Variables (Raw Scores) 








Response duration 22.39 (13.97) 16.78 (10.95) 19.63 (12.80) 
Eye contact count 6.84 (2.75) 7.57 (3.73) 7.20 (3.27) 
Eye contact 
duration 
22.92 (11.62) 19.92(12.01) 21.44 (11.83) 
Comment count 3.71 (1.77) 4.92 (2.63) 4.31 (2.30) 
Comment duration 13.21 (9.97) 13.57 (7.92) 13.39 (8.96) 
Positive affect 1.82 (.69) 1.49 (.56) 1.65 (.65) 





Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Social Interaction Variable from Mood Conditions and Perceived Intensity of 
Positive Emotions. 





















Step 1 .05  .03  .07  .08*  .01  .07  .001  
   Condition  .22  -.07  .16  -.26*  -.05  .26*  .04 
   Positive  
      intensity 
 .07  .18  .22  .11  .10  .01  -.10 
Step 2 .001  .003  .004  .001  .01  .01  .001  
   Condition  .22  -.07 .16   -.26*  -.05  .26*  .04 
   Positive  
      intensity 
 .10  .21 .28   .09  .01  .08  -.10 
   Condition x  
      Positive  
       intensity 
 -.05  -.07 -.08   .02  .14  -.10  .001 






Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Social Interaction Variable from Mood Conditions and Perceived Intensity of 
Negative Emotions. 





















Step 1 .05  .06  .12*  .08*  .01  .09*  .004  
   Condition  .22  -.07  .17  -.26*  -.05  .27*  .04 
   Negative  
      intensity 
 .08  .24*  .31*  .09  .08  .18  -.05 
Step 2 .01  .01  .001  .01  .01  .01  .001  
   Condition  .22  -.07  .17  -.26*  -.06  .27*  .04 
Negative      
   intensity 
 .01  .33*  .32*  .17  .15  .21  -.02 
   Condition x  
       Negative  
       intensity 
 .12  -.14  -.01  -.12  -.12  -.07  -.04 







 Mood Ratings for Positive Affect 
 
 




























Appendix A: Demographic Questionnaire 
 
The first part of this survey is background information about you.   
 
1.  Age:  ________________  
 
2.  Gender: 
  Male  
  Female 
 
3.  Race/Ethnicity: 
 Caucasian  
 African American 
 Hispanic 
 Asian 
 Pacific Islander 
 Other    (Please specify)_________________ 
 
4. Country of origin: _________________ 
 
5. Is English your first language? 
 Yes  
  No 
 
6.  Year in college? _________________ 
 
7.  What is your college major? 
 (Please specify) _________________ 
 Undecided 
 
8.  Have you been diagnosed or are currently diagnosed with any mood disorder (e.g., depression, bipolar 
disorder, etc.)? 
 Yes (Please specify) _________________ 
  No 
 
 
9.  Have you been physically abused? 
 Yes  





Appendix B: Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Circle the response on the scale below that indicates how well each adjective 
describes your present mood. 
 
definitely do not feel    do not feel      slightly feel      definitely feel 
 
Lively    1               2    3    4 
 
Drowsy    1               2    3    4 
 
Happy     1               2    3    4 
 
Grouchy    1               2    3    4 
 
Sad      1               2    3    4 
 
Peppy                1               2    3    4 
 
Tired     1               2    3    4 
 
Nervous    1               2    3    4 
 
Caring     1               2    3    4 
 
Calm                1               2    3    4 
 
Content               1               2    3    4 
 
Loving                1               2    3    4 
 
Gloomy    1               2    3    4 
 
Fed up                1               2    3    4 
 
Jittery                1               2    3    4 
 
Active                1               2    3    4 
 




Appendix C: Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) Questionnaire 
  
 In this questionnaire, you'll be asked to answer questions that concern how you 
generally experience emotionally intimate relationship. Please indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with each statement by circling a number for each item. 
 
1. I'm afraid that I will lose my partner's love. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
2. I often worry that my partner will not want to stay with me. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
3. I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
4. I worry that romantic partners won’t care about me as much as I care about them. 
  
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
5. I often wish that my partner's feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for him or her. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
6. I worry a lot about my relationships. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  





7. When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become interested in someone 
else. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
8. When I show my feelings for romantic partners, I'm afraid they will not feel the same about 
me. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
9. I rarely worry about my partner leaving me. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
10. My romantic partner makes me doubt myself. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
11. I do not often worry about being abandoned. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
12. I find that my partner(s) don't want to get as close as I would like. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
13. Sometimes romantic partners change their feelings about me for no apparent reason. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  





14. My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
15. I'm afraid that once a romantic partner gets to know me, he or she won't like who I really am. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
16. It makes me mad that I don't get the affection and support I need from my partner.  
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
17. I worry that I won't measure up to other people. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
18. My partner only seems to notice me when I’m angry. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
19. I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
20. I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  





21. I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on romantic partners. 
  
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
22. I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
23. I don't feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
24. I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
25. I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
26. I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner.  
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
27. It's not difficult for me to get close to my partner. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  





28. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
29. It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
30. I tell my partner just about everything. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
31. I talk things over with my partner. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
32. I am nervous when partners get too close to me. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
33. I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
34. I find it easy to depend on romantic partners. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  





35. It's easy for me to be affectionate with my partner. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  
disagree                           agree 
 
36. My partner really understands me and my needs. 
 
     1           2           3           4           5           6           7 
Strongly              Strongly  





 Appendix D: Scripts for Positive and Negative Event Recalling 
 
Positive event recalling 
“Now, I’m going to ask you to think of a very positive experience that you could describe to me.  
So during the next two minutes, please think of a personal experience that has happened to you 
that made you very happy, and that still really makes you feel really good when you think about.  
Once you think of something that you’d be willing to describe briefly to me, let me know.  
Again, it can be something that happened very recently or something that happened in your more 
distant past, but it should be something that still makes you happy.  I’ll give you two minutes, 
then start recording your response.” 
 
 After two minutes, the experimenter will ask: 
 
“    1. Would you please describe your experience in detail?  For example, you can describe what 
happened, people involved, and how it made you feel.  
 
2. Is there anything else about the experience that made you feel good?” 
 
 
Negative event recalling 
“Now, I am going to ask you to recall a personal experience that happened to you. I want you to 
take the next two minutes and think about an upsetting event that still really bothers you and that 
you’d be willing to describe briefly to me. It can be something that happened very recently or 
something that happened in your past, but it should be something that is still upsetting. I’ll give 
you two minutes to think of something and I’ll start recording after the 2 minutes is up.” 
 
 After two minutes, the experimenter will ask: 
 
 “    1. Would you please describe your experience in detail?  For example, you can describe 
what happened, people involved, and how it made you feel.  
 






Appendix E: Ekman Photos and Questions in the Emotion Perception Task 
 
 




                                      Sad               Surprise           Happy 
 
 
Questions followed each face stimulus: 
 








     iia.    How intense is the emotion? 
 
 
Not at all intense  Extremely intense 
 
 
     iib. If you chose “neutral”, what is the valence of the emotion? 
 
 






Appendix F: Coding sheet for social interaction 
Background on the social interaction task: 
The confederate will enter the room and introduce him/herself as another researcher in the lab. 
Then, the confederate will launch a series of scripted icebreaker comments in an attempt to 
initiate a social conversation with the participants. Also, the confederate will ask participants for 
a favor. For observation purpose, the confederate’s act will be broken down into a series of 
standard units, demarcated by a standard comment. In sequence, the confederate will deliver the 
following scripts: 
 
1. Confederate enters the room and says “Oh, I am sorry. I didn’t realize that 
someone is in this room.  Are you here for the psychology study?” 
2. As the participant replies, the confederate asks “Is it over?” 
i. If yes/I think so/probably, etc., then say “OK, good, I just need a table to 
sort this stack of articles. Would you mind if I sit here?” 
ii. If no/I don’t think so, etc., then say, “Let me check with someone. (then 
ask Frankie, who says “yeah, that’s fine, we’re done.”). After Frankie 
responds, turn to the participant and say “I need a table to sort this stack 
of articles, would you mind if I sit here?” 
3. The confederate will sit down and say “By the way, I am one of the undergraduate 
researchers in this lab. So, how was the study?”  
i. If the participant gives a positive comment, say “that’s cool/good…” 
ii. If the participant gives a negative comment, say “Well, at least you are 
done with it.” 
4. The confederate says “I need to alphabetize this stack of articles by the authors’ 
last name. Can you help me out? You don’t have to. . No pressure” 
5. If the participant agrees to help, the confederate will give the participant the stack of 
exactly 10 articles to sort. If the participant refuses to help, the confederate will sort 
the articles by him/herself. In either case, the confederate then asks the participant 
“Are you a psychology major?” 
6. As the participant answers, the confederate says “What classes are you taking 
now?” 




Please watch the video for multiple times as you do your coding. When you watch the video for 
the first time, you can focus on the global codes (underlined) and try to get a feel of the general 
social interaction style of the participant. Once you get the global codes, you can repeat the video 
to capture the participant’s comments and eye contacts (bolded) and record the duration 
accordingly. You may repeat the video for as many times as you need to get these codes. You 
can also use the “rewind” or “fast forward” functions to help you precisely get the codes and 
record the duration. After that, please rate the positive and negative affect of the participant 
based on his/her tone of voice, facial expression and body movement. Finally, note any 




SOCIAL INTERACTION CODING SYSTEM                   Subject #_______       Coder:_______ 
You will code the social interaction style of the participant on three domains: 1) agreeableness; 
2) engagement; and 3) affect. Here are the instructions: 
Agreeableness 
a. Did the participant let the confederate into the room? _______ 
 0 = no 
 1 = yes 
b. Did the participant help the confederate to sort articles? _______ 
 0 = reject the initial request  
 1 = help upon initial request, but no further volunteering 
 2 = agree to the initial request and offers additional help to the confederate after he/she complete the 
original request 
c. Did the participant respond to standard question 5, 6, 7? (0 = no; 1 = yes) 
 Question 5 (Psy Major?) _______ 
 Length of the response _______seconds 
 Question 6 (What Classes?) _______ 
 Length of the response _________seconds 
 Question 7 (How are they?) _______ 







a. Please record all the eye contact that the participant made and note the duration of each eye contact 
in second:  
i .  when confederate asked he/she the standard questions (count the total #) ___ 
 duration of the eye contact(s)______________________________________ 
i i .  when he/she responded to the standard questions (count the total #) _______ 
 duration of the eye contact(s) _____________________________________ 
i i i .  when he/she initiated an unrelated comment (count the total #)______ 
 duration of the eye contact(s) ______________________________________ 
b. Please record all incidents for which the participant initiates new comments that are irrelevant to the 
standard questions (i.e., anything unrelated to their major, the classes they are taking and how they 
feel about the classes) and note the duration of each comment. 
 Number of new comment(s) _______ 
 Duration of the comment(s) ______________________________________ 
c. Please note the approach behavior(s) of the participant. 
i .  Did the participant move the chair close to the confederate? _______ 
 0 = no 
 1 = yes 
i i .  Did the participant clear the table for the confederate? ______ 
 0 = no 









a. Please rate the participant’s POSITIVE affect based on his/her tone of voice, facial expression and body movement (Circle your rating). 
 1 2 3 4 
Tone of voice monotonous or flat 
tone of voice (i.e. no 
fluctuations in tone) 
















with no visible 
positive affect 
 
forced smile (angled 
upward movement of lip 
corners, but not 
movement around the 
eyebrows) 
Some weak polite/social 
smiles (brief, usually in 




genuine smile (angled upward 
movement of lip corners, raised check, 
contraction of muscles around the eyes) 
 
exaggerated, expansive, or animated 
expression 
Body movements minimum body 
movements other 
than those needed 
for completely the 
task 
body movements to 
make self more 
comfortable (e.g. leaning 
forward, adjusting sitting 
posture) 
moderate amount of body 
movements (e.g. gesturing 
while talking) 
body movements or gestures that 
indicate happiness (e.g. cover the mouth 
when laughing, tapping on the table 






b. Please rate the participant’s NEGATIVE affect based on his/her tone of voice, facial expression and body movement (Circle your rating). 
 1 2 3 4 











Low and soft voice, 






Insistent, defiant tone of 
voice 
 




















Facial expressions no negative affect 




eyes gaze randomly 
moving around the 
surroundings of the 
room aimlessly 
 
eyes partially closed 





Slight frowning (lip 
corners pulled down, 
lower lip depressed) 
 
inner corners of 
eyebrows may be raised 
and come together 
 
bottom lip may protrude 





eyelids tighten or 
narrow 
 
mouth or jaw set; lips 
pressed, tightened, or 
protruding;  
 
eyebrows may be 








frequent frowning (lip corners pulled 
down, lower lip depressed)  
 
tears in the eyes 
 
eyes may crinkle and lower eyelids may 
be raised 
 




clenched jaw or teeth 
 
narrowed eyes and pursed lips 
 
eye-rolling or scoff 
Body movements no body movement 





indicative of boredom 
or fatigue (e.g., hands 
support head, 
scratching face, 
decreasing stature with 
slumped shoulder, 




(e.g. physical passivity 
and withdrawal, 
randomly flip through 
the articles) 
body movements or gesture indicative of 
negative emotionality (e.g. collapsed 






Was there anything unusual/strange/noteworthy about the recording? ______________________ 
